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Home Regulation

Not Just a Messaging App: The Case of Telegram and the Need for AML/CFT Oversight of SMSPs

Coininsight by Coininsight
November 19, 2026
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by Sevinj Novruzova and Nofar Shemla Kadosh

From left to right: Sevinj Novruzova and Nofar Shemla Kadosh. Photos courtesy of the authors.

At present, a significant regulatory gap exists in the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) framework with respect to encrypted messaging platforms such as Telegram. Although such platforms, and Telegram in particular, have reportedly played a crucial role in facilitating both coordination and financial arrangements among criminal and terrorist networks, as we demonstrate below, they have not been subject to meaningful financial regulatory oversight. Despite integrating or enabling access to crypto trading and payment functionalities within its interface, Telegram is not classified as a reporting entity, such as a financial institution or a virtual asset service provider (VASP). Consequently, the relevant AML/CFT reporting obligations remain primarily imposed on banks, VASPs, and other regulated financial intermediaries.

In June 2026, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) addressed this gap from a new perspective by expressly recognizing that social media, instant messaging applications, and streaming platforms (SMSPs) have evolved from communication tools into complex digital ecosystems that increasingly integrate, or enable access to, payment systems, virtual assets, and other financial services.[1] At the same time, however, the FATF emphasized that “SMSPs do not currently fall under one of the sectors which are required to be subject to AML/CFT obligations under the FATF Standards and therefore, most national frameworks.”[2] The report further identified the resulting “blurring of regulatory responsibilities” and called for greater clarity regarding which activities fall within the AML/CFT framework and which entities should bear the corresponding obligations.[3]

Although this represents a step in the right direction, two important qualifications remain.

First, an SMSP’s regulatory status depends on the functions it performs. Where an SMSP merely provides the technical infrastructure or interface through which regulated third parties deliver payment or virtual-asset services, primary AML/CFT responsibility may rest with the relevant third party. Depending on the platform’s degree of control, influence, or economic benefit, however, complementary platform-level obligations may also be warranted. Where the SMSP itself provides, controls, or materially influences covered financial services – including the custody, transfer, or exchange of funds or virtual assets – it may itself fall within the functional definition of a financial institution or VASP and become directly subject to the corresponding obligations.

Second, the June 2026 Report itself does not amend the FATF Standards or create new AML/CFT obligations for SMSPs. As a policy and risk-analysis document, it instead identifies emerging risks, clarifies which activities may already fall within existing FATF-defined categories, and may inform future guidance, interpretive clarification, or amendments to the Standards.

The Report therefore identifies the problem without resolving how responsibility should be allocated within ecosystems such as Telegram, where communication infrastructure, marketplaces, automated tools, and third-party financial services coexist.

Against this backdrop, this article examines the remaining regulatory gap using Telegram as a case study. Building on the emerging functional approach reflected in the June 2026 FATF Report, we argue that full AML/CFT obligations should attach to the entity that provides or materially controls a covered financial service. Where Telegram does not itself provide or materially control such a service, it should nevertheless be subject to complementary, risk-based obligations proportionate to its role in integrating financial services, controlling user access and interfaces, its access to relevant data, and its role in facilitating illicit financial coordination.

Telegram today functions as far more than a simple messaging application. Telegram’s highly modular features allow the creation of market-like virtual spaces. These include supergroups consisting of up to 200,000 users, alongside the ability to communicate directly with “clients” in private chats; channels that allow administrators to broadcast messages to large numbers of users, usually for one-way communication and announcements; indexes of seller groups organized by topic, such as area of distribution or type of product; and Wallet,  a third-party mini app integrated into Telegram’s interface, which provides access to crypto services, including purchases using bank cards through Crypto Wallet, alongside a self-custodial wallet called DeFi Account.[4] Users can also design payment and enforcement bots that condition access to certain groups or content upon payment or perform trading actions on their behalf.[5]

As a result, Telegram has become a market itself – a forum that hosts various informal submarkets, such as bot-based crypto trading, NFT transactions, and more.[6] These same features, however, combined with the platform’s user-privacy policy, its at-times indifferent approach to content moderation, and its history of refusing to cooperate with national law-enforcement authorities, have also attracted criminal actors and terrorist affiliates.[7] Drug dealing, trade in non-consensual pornography, contraband, weapons trafficking, pirated content, and illicit content involving minors are all easily found on the app.[8] All of this culminated in the August 2024 arrest of the company’s CEO and founder, Pavel Durov, by French authorities.[9]

The June 2026 FATF report specifically identifies terrorist-financing risks associated with social media, instant messaging applications and streaming platforms (SMSPs). It notes that individuals involved in terrorist financing rely on SMSPs to facilitate operational coordination and financial arrangements by “combining public platforms to amplify fundraising narratives with encrypted messaging apps for coordination, payment sharing, and moving activities into private channels.”[10] This combination enables their activities to expand geographically while making them harder to detect. In addition, in its July 2025 report, the FATF notes that individuals involved in terrorist financing exploit money or value transfer services (MVTS) to move funds across jurisdictions. It also specifically identifies Telegram as one of the platforms used to share payment information, including cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and to coordinate or facilitate transfers.[11]

For example, in 2020, Spanish authorities uncovered an ISIL-affiliated terrorist-financing network that relied on Telegram as one of its primary channel for maintaining operational links and organizing the movement of funds. Although the group also exploited MVTS platforms to transfer money across jurisdictions, Telegram sustained the network’s communication and logistical coordination.[12]

Similar patterns emerged in cases from Belgium and Indonesia. Belgium’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) identified two cases, in 2019 and 2022, involving the use of VASPs to transfer virtual assets from Europe to high-risk jurisdictions in the Middle East, with coordination taking place through Telegram and WhatsApp.[13] In 2023, Indonesian authorities also arrested individuals who used Telegram to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, raise funds, and maintain direct contact with an Indonesian terrorist in the al-Hol camp to arrange financial transfers.[14]

Although Telegram played a crucial role in facilitating both operational coordination and financial arrangements across these cases, that role alone did not bring the platform within the scope of AML/CFT obligations.

Moreover, although the FATF’s June 2026 Report identifies the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the “abuse of payment systems incorporated into the SMSPs interface,”[15] it does not provide a clear framework for determining when an SMSP such as Telegram should itself be regarded as a reporting entity. The financial services provided through the wallet may be subject to the AML/CFT obligations applicable to TG Wallet Inc., VASPs, banks, and other regulated financial-service providers involved in the transactions.

However, although Telegram integrates financial services into its interface and may facilitate illicit financial activity, the FATF treats it as part of the broader category of social media, messaging, and streaming platforms (SMSPs), rather than as a distinct category of reporting entities. Consequently, Telegram is neither classified as a reporting entity – such as a financial institution or a virtual asset service provider (VASP) – nor subject to AML/CFT obligations merely by virtue of its status as a messaging platform.[16]

As terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks increasingly exploit messaging platforms that integrate or enable access to financial services, the absence of clear platform-level AML/CFT obligations has become a significant gap in the global regulatory framework. Platforms such as Telegram are being used for illicit financial coordination while remaining outside the scope of AML/CFT obligations applicable to financial institutions and virtual asset service providers (VASPs).[17]

To maintain the effectiveness and relevance of the international regulatory framework, future FATF guidance and recommendations should clarify when such platforms fall within the AML/CFT regulatory perimeter and which obligations should apply to the platform itself, the relevant financial-service provider, or both. In addition, there should be clear criteria for determining when such a platform can be treated as a reporting entity and when it should not, particularly where it is used solely for communication.

We believe that the case of Telegram especially highlights this remaining regulatory gap. As technology evolves, traditional definitions of what constitutes a financial or non-financial entity are being challenged and eroded.[18] Telegram’s multifunctional infrastructure presents a significant classification challenge:[19] It is neither a purely instant-messaging service nor purely a “digital wallet.” However, considering the scope of financial activities conducted through the platform, especially illicit financial activity, and the variety of payment and money transfer functionalities integrated into or accessible through its interface, classifying Telegram merely as an instant-messaging service creates a vulnerability that allows illicit activities to remain hidden.

Based on the typologies identified in the FATF’s June 2026 report, the FATF could consider three potential approaches to addressing the role of messaging apps such as Telegram in money laundering and terrorist financing risks:

1. Designating Telegram as Subject to AML/CFT Obligations

The first option would be to consider whether Telegram should be brought within the scope of AML/CFT obligations under the FATF Standards. This could extend beyond situations where Telegram provides or facilitates financial services to circumstances where, even when acting primarily as a communications or technology intermediary, its platform is used to facilitate or coordinate activities raising credible money laundering or terrorist-financing concerns.

As highlighted in the FATF’s June 2026 typologies, messaging apps may enable criminal and terrorist actors to communicate, recruit, solicit funds, conduct fundraising, exploit monetization features, and coordinate illicit activities before any financial transaction occurs. The vulnerability is therefore not limited to “pure” financial services embedded in or connected to Telegram but may also arise at the communication and coordination stage preceding a financial transaction.

Accordingly, the FATF could consider a proportionate, risk-based framework under which SMSPs could become subject to defined AML/CFT responsibilities, potentially including reporting-entity obligations where their activities and risk exposure justify such treatment. The applicable obligations could be calibrated according to platform functionality, degree of control or involvement, and the nature of the financial-crime or terrorist-financing risks.

It is reasonable to ask whether imposing reporting duties on a messaging platform raises privacy and freedom of expression concerns. Without resolving that question, it is worth noting the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) as an example of a regulatory framework that already imposes specific content-related obligations on certain online services. Depending on the type of service, these obligations include providing notice-and-action mechanisms, reporting on content moderation, and taking measures to protect minors. The DSA also requires designated very large online platforms and very large online search engines to assess and mitigate systemic risks arising from the design, functioning, or use of their services.[20] Telegram itself has faced scrutiny under the DSA over its reported EU user numbers, alongside separate criminal proceedings in France involving its founder and CEO, Pavel Durov.[21]

2. Maintaining the Existing Framework, with Enhanced Risk Differentiation and Due Diligence

The second option would be to retain the existing distinction between traditional obligated entities such as banks and other regulated financial institutions and SMSPs such as Telegram, without formally designating SMSPs as AML/CFT-obligated entities.

However, we do not consider a strict binary approach to be fully adequate, given the hybrid and evolving nature of platforms such as Telegram. If the FATF wishes to preserve a clear legal distinction between traditional financial institutions and technology or communications platforms, it could consider introducing a new intermediate category or otherwise explicitly recognizing the heightened risks associated with such platforms.

Under this approach, banks, VASPs, wallet providers, and other regulated financial institutions would remain primarily responsible for conducting enhanced customer due diligence and transaction monitoring when dealing with financial activities involving Telegram or similar platforms. Telegram would remain an intermediary rather than a traditional obligated entity but could be expected to respond to lawful and proportionate information requests from regulated financial institutions and competent authorities where relevant to the continuation or assessment of financial activity conducted through or in connection with its platform.

3. Adopting a Multi-Category, Function-Based Approach

The third option would adopt a multi-category or functional approach, identifying the specific contexts in which Telegram and similar SMSPs move beyond their role as instant messaging or communications platforms and become facilitators of financial activity or financial crime.

Under this model, Telegram’s regulatory status and obligations would depend on the specific functionality and activity involved. While ordinary communications would remain outside traditional AML/CFT obligations, proportionate responsibilities could apply where Telegram facilitates fundraising, monetization, peer-to-peer transfers, virtual assets, embedded payment services, or other financial activities.

This approach broadly aligns with the FATF’s June 2026 report and its functional, risk-based assessment of SMSPs. It offers regulatory flexibility while avoiding the imposition of full AML/CFT obligations solely because a platform is used for communications. The key challenge, however, would be establishing clear thresholds and ensuring effective enforcement when a platform moves from a communications intermediary to a material facilitator of financial activity or terrorist financing.

Of the three approaches, the third option, a multi-category, function-based framework, may provide the most proportionate and flexible long-term solution, while incorporating elements of the first two approaches. The FATF could establish clear thresholds for when an SMSP remains a neutral communications intermediary, when it assumes enhanced cooperation and information-sharing responsibilities, and when its specific activities bring it within the scope of AML/CFT obligations.

Regardless of the regulatory model selected, the FATF should consider three complementary measures:

  1. Adopt proportionate, risk-based AML/CFT responsibilities based on platform functionality, particularly where SMSPs facilitate fundraising, monetization, virtual assets, or payment services.
  2. Extend reporting and escalation mechanisms to the pre-transaction stage to enable the identification and escalation of credible terrorist-financing and financial-crime indicators before funds are transferred.
  3. Strengthen information-sharing and cooperation among SMSPs, competent authorities, financial institutions, and VASPs to support earlier intervention and address emerging typologies.

Overall, the FATF should clarify the respective responsibilities of SMSPs and financial-sector actors across the financial-crime and terrorist-financing lifecycle, recognizing that risks may arise at the communication and coordination stage well before a financial transaction occurs.

Telegram illustrates why AML/CFT oversight cannot end with the formal classification of the entity executing a transaction. Full obligations should remain with the entity providing or materially controlling the covered financial service, while proportionate platform-level duties may be warranted where Telegram’s own role creates distinct risks.

We believe this allocation would allow financial enforcement to serve as an additional tool in broader efforts to combat criminal activity on Telegram – much of which is financial in nature, ranging from the sale of nonconsensual intimate images to illicit arms dealing – and to strengthen existing regulatory frameworks aimed at promoting user safety in online spaces.

[1] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Detecting and Disrupting Terrorist Financing Activity through Social Media, Instant Messaging Applications and Streaming Platforms (SMSPs) (26 June 2026),TF and social media.

[2] Ibid, p.6.

[3] Ibid, p.4.

[4]See Crypto Wallet, https://walt.io/ton.

[5] See, e.g., Mirko Franco, Ombretta Gaggi, and Claudio E. Palazzi, Characterizing Non-Consensual Intimate Image Abuse on Telegram Groups and Channels, In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Open Challenges in Online Social Networks (OASIS ‘24), Poznań, Poland, September 2024 (Association for Computing Machinery, 2024) https://doi.org/10.1145/3677117.3685008. This may also create in the relevant cases an emerging regulatory gap at the intersection of autonomous AI agents, digital monetization and financial crime. Within Telegram’s ecosystem, such bots may automate payment collection, enforce paid access to digital communities and execute financial transactions, potentially creating opportunities for money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion. While FATF has examined AI-related AML/CFT vulnerabilities, terrorist-financing risks associated with social media and instant messaging platforms, and risks involving virtual assets and decentralized finance, the specific implications of autonomous AI-enabled payment and trading bots remain underexplored. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (July 2025), at p.59.

[6] Taro Tsuchiya et al., A Large-Scale Study of Telegram Bots, 20 Proc. Int’l AAAI Conf. on Web & Soc. Media 2280, 2280–93 (2026), https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v20i1.42750; Flavia S., Telegram NFT Transactions Soar by 400% in Q3, Driven by Gaming Surge, Cryptoflies (October 21, 2024), https://blog.cryptoflies.com/telegram-nft-transactions-soar-by-400-in-q3-driven-by-gaming-surge/.

[7]Michael Barbaro, How Telegram Became a Platform for Terrorism, The Daily podcast – New York times (Sept. 23, 2024); Urian B., Telegram Sees Over 100% Increase in Cybercriminal Activities | Data Dumps Spotted, Tech Times (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/265498/20210917/telegram-sees-over-100-increase-in-cybercriminal-activities-data-dumps-spotted.htm; Sheera Frenkel and Stuart A. Thompson, Telegram’s Role in Crime and Terrorism Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/07/technology/telegram-crime-terrorism.html; Mamoun Alazab and Kate Macfarlane, Why Telegram became the go-to app for Ukrainians – despite being rife with Russian disinformation, IMEdD (April 4, 2022); Polly Thompson, One year after his arrest, Pavel Durov says he’d ‘rather die’ than give third parties access to messages on Telegram, Business Insider (Aug 25, 2025), https://www.businessinsider.com/pavel-durov-telegram-ceo-user-data-privacy-arrest-2025-8.

[8]  Joeri Loggen et al., Online criminal markets on Telegram: Exploring the illicit products and services advertised in public group chats, 182 Computers in Human Behavior (2026).

[9] See footnote 23 below.

[10] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), p. 5.

[11] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (July 2025), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/comprehensive-update-terrorist-financing-risks-2025.html.

[12] Ibid, pp. 40-41. For more information see, Spain’s High Court Orders Block on Telegram Messaging  App as a Precautionary Measure, Euronews (Mar. 23, 2024), https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/03/23/spains-high-court-orders-block-on-telegram-messaging-app-as-a-precautionary-measure.

[13] Ibid, pp. 69-70.

[14] Ibid, p. 73.

[15] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), p. 5.

[16] Alongside instant messaging services, mobile money also gained increased significance for financiers and groups, especially in jurisdictions where registration of SIM cards is not controlled and particularly where mobile money operators are not subject to AML/CFT regulation or are unaware of the TF risks they face. These patterns are particularly observed in East and Central Africa, as well as in Yemen. See, e.g., GABAC, Mutual Evaluation Report of Republic of Chad (July 2023), p. 87; FATF, Guidance for a risk-based approach: Prepaid cards, mobile payments and internet-based payment services (June 2013), para. 112.

[17] This may also relate to the prevailing approach in platform-liability doctrine, which generally exempts social-media and communication platforms from responsibility for user-generated content. Under U.S. federal law for example, Section 230 shields “interactive computer services” – including search engines, social-media platforms, websites, and message boards – from tort or state criminal liability for third-party content, subject to statutory exceptions.

[18] Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks, FATF (July 2025), https://blog.cryptoflies.com/telegram-nft-transactions-soar-by-400-in-q3-driven-by-gaming-surge/.  

[19] Discord and Signal are also relevant platforms that may raise similar classification issues.

[20] See Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 19, 2022, arts. 15,16, 28, 34-35, 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1, 64–66 (Digital Services Act) (requiring very large online platforms to identify, analyze, assess, and mitigate systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning, or use of their services).

[21] In August 2024, Telegram founder and CEO Pavel Durov was arrested in France and subsequently placed under formal investigation for, inter alia, alleged complicity in administering an online platform used to facilitate illicit transactions, offenses relating to illegal content, and failures to cooperate with competent authorities. Separately, EU authorities examined Telegram for potential DSA-related violations, while several countries threatened to block or restrict the platform over concerns regarding illegal content, disinformation, and limited cooperation with law-enforcement authorities. See: Pascale Davies, Telegram ban: Which countries are clamping down on it and why?, EuroNews (August 27, 2024), https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/08/27/telegram-which-countries-have-banned-it-or-are-clamping-down-on-it-and-why; Ingrid Melander and Guy Faulconbridge, Telegram messaging app CEO Durov arrested in France, Reuters (August 24, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/telegram-messaging-app-ceo-pavel-durov-arrested-france-tf1-tv-says-2024-08-24/; EU Investigating if Telegram Played Down User Numbers to Avoid Regulation, Ars Technica (Aug. 2024), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/08/eu-investigating-if-telegram-played-down-user-numbers-to-avoid-regulation/.

Sevinj Novruzova is an Affiliated Fellow and Nofar Shemla Kadosh is a Graduate Student Fellow at the New York University Information Law Institute. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed within all posts are those of the author(s) alone and do not represent those of the Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) or of the New York University School of Law. PCCE makes no representations as to the accuracy, completeness and validity or any statements made on this site and will not be liable any errors, omissions or representations. The copyright of this content belongs to the author(s) and any liability with regards to infringement of intellectual property rights remains with the author(s).

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by Sevinj Novruzova and Nofar Shemla Kadosh

From left to right: Sevinj Novruzova and Nofar Shemla Kadosh. Photos courtesy of the authors.

At present, a significant regulatory gap exists in the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) framework with respect to encrypted messaging platforms such as Telegram. Although such platforms, and Telegram in particular, have reportedly played a crucial role in facilitating both coordination and financial arrangements among criminal and terrorist networks, as we demonstrate below, they have not been subject to meaningful financial regulatory oversight. Despite integrating or enabling access to crypto trading and payment functionalities within its interface, Telegram is not classified as a reporting entity, such as a financial institution or a virtual asset service provider (VASP). Consequently, the relevant AML/CFT reporting obligations remain primarily imposed on banks, VASPs, and other regulated financial intermediaries.

In June 2026, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) addressed this gap from a new perspective by expressly recognizing that social media, instant messaging applications, and streaming platforms (SMSPs) have evolved from communication tools into complex digital ecosystems that increasingly integrate, or enable access to, payment systems, virtual assets, and other financial services.[1] At the same time, however, the FATF emphasized that “SMSPs do not currently fall under one of the sectors which are required to be subject to AML/CFT obligations under the FATF Standards and therefore, most national frameworks.”[2] The report further identified the resulting “blurring of regulatory responsibilities” and called for greater clarity regarding which activities fall within the AML/CFT framework and which entities should bear the corresponding obligations.[3]

Although this represents a step in the right direction, two important qualifications remain.

First, an SMSP’s regulatory status depends on the functions it performs. Where an SMSP merely provides the technical infrastructure or interface through which regulated third parties deliver payment or virtual-asset services, primary AML/CFT responsibility may rest with the relevant third party. Depending on the platform’s degree of control, influence, or economic benefit, however, complementary platform-level obligations may also be warranted. Where the SMSP itself provides, controls, or materially influences covered financial services – including the custody, transfer, or exchange of funds or virtual assets – it may itself fall within the functional definition of a financial institution or VASP and become directly subject to the corresponding obligations.

Second, the June 2026 Report itself does not amend the FATF Standards or create new AML/CFT obligations for SMSPs. As a policy and risk-analysis document, it instead identifies emerging risks, clarifies which activities may already fall within existing FATF-defined categories, and may inform future guidance, interpretive clarification, or amendments to the Standards.

The Report therefore identifies the problem without resolving how responsibility should be allocated within ecosystems such as Telegram, where communication infrastructure, marketplaces, automated tools, and third-party financial services coexist.

Against this backdrop, this article examines the remaining regulatory gap using Telegram as a case study. Building on the emerging functional approach reflected in the June 2026 FATF Report, we argue that full AML/CFT obligations should attach to the entity that provides or materially controls a covered financial service. Where Telegram does not itself provide or materially control such a service, it should nevertheless be subject to complementary, risk-based obligations proportionate to its role in integrating financial services, controlling user access and interfaces, its access to relevant data, and its role in facilitating illicit financial coordination.

Telegram today functions as far more than a simple messaging application. Telegram’s highly modular features allow the creation of market-like virtual spaces. These include supergroups consisting of up to 200,000 users, alongside the ability to communicate directly with “clients” in private chats; channels that allow administrators to broadcast messages to large numbers of users, usually for one-way communication and announcements; indexes of seller groups organized by topic, such as area of distribution or type of product; and Wallet,  a third-party mini app integrated into Telegram’s interface, which provides access to crypto services, including purchases using bank cards through Crypto Wallet, alongside a self-custodial wallet called DeFi Account.[4] Users can also design payment and enforcement bots that condition access to certain groups or content upon payment or perform trading actions on their behalf.[5]

As a result, Telegram has become a market itself – a forum that hosts various informal submarkets, such as bot-based crypto trading, NFT transactions, and more.[6] These same features, however, combined with the platform’s user-privacy policy, its at-times indifferent approach to content moderation, and its history of refusing to cooperate with national law-enforcement authorities, have also attracted criminal actors and terrorist affiliates.[7] Drug dealing, trade in non-consensual pornography, contraband, weapons trafficking, pirated content, and illicit content involving minors are all easily found on the app.[8] All of this culminated in the August 2024 arrest of the company’s CEO and founder, Pavel Durov, by French authorities.[9]

The June 2026 FATF report specifically identifies terrorist-financing risks associated with social media, instant messaging applications and streaming platforms (SMSPs). It notes that individuals involved in terrorist financing rely on SMSPs to facilitate operational coordination and financial arrangements by “combining public platforms to amplify fundraising narratives with encrypted messaging apps for coordination, payment sharing, and moving activities into private channels.”[10] This combination enables their activities to expand geographically while making them harder to detect. In addition, in its July 2025 report, the FATF notes that individuals involved in terrorist financing exploit money or value transfer services (MVTS) to move funds across jurisdictions. It also specifically identifies Telegram as one of the platforms used to share payment information, including cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and to coordinate or facilitate transfers.[11]

For example, in 2020, Spanish authorities uncovered an ISIL-affiliated terrorist-financing network that relied on Telegram as one of its primary channel for maintaining operational links and organizing the movement of funds. Although the group also exploited MVTS platforms to transfer money across jurisdictions, Telegram sustained the network’s communication and logistical coordination.[12]

Similar patterns emerged in cases from Belgium and Indonesia. Belgium’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) identified two cases, in 2019 and 2022, involving the use of VASPs to transfer virtual assets from Europe to high-risk jurisdictions in the Middle East, with coordination taking place through Telegram and WhatsApp.[13] In 2023, Indonesian authorities also arrested individuals who used Telegram to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, raise funds, and maintain direct contact with an Indonesian terrorist in the al-Hol camp to arrange financial transfers.[14]

Although Telegram played a crucial role in facilitating both operational coordination and financial arrangements across these cases, that role alone did not bring the platform within the scope of AML/CFT obligations.

Moreover, although the FATF’s June 2026 Report identifies the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the “abuse of payment systems incorporated into the SMSPs interface,”[15] it does not provide a clear framework for determining when an SMSP such as Telegram should itself be regarded as a reporting entity. The financial services provided through the wallet may be subject to the AML/CFT obligations applicable to TG Wallet Inc., VASPs, banks, and other regulated financial-service providers involved in the transactions.

However, although Telegram integrates financial services into its interface and may facilitate illicit financial activity, the FATF treats it as part of the broader category of social media, messaging, and streaming platforms (SMSPs), rather than as a distinct category of reporting entities. Consequently, Telegram is neither classified as a reporting entity – such as a financial institution or a virtual asset service provider (VASP) – nor subject to AML/CFT obligations merely by virtue of its status as a messaging platform.[16]

As terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks increasingly exploit messaging platforms that integrate or enable access to financial services, the absence of clear platform-level AML/CFT obligations has become a significant gap in the global regulatory framework. Platforms such as Telegram are being used for illicit financial coordination while remaining outside the scope of AML/CFT obligations applicable to financial institutions and virtual asset service providers (VASPs).[17]

To maintain the effectiveness and relevance of the international regulatory framework, future FATF guidance and recommendations should clarify when such platforms fall within the AML/CFT regulatory perimeter and which obligations should apply to the platform itself, the relevant financial-service provider, or both. In addition, there should be clear criteria for determining when such a platform can be treated as a reporting entity and when it should not, particularly where it is used solely for communication.

We believe that the case of Telegram especially highlights this remaining regulatory gap. As technology evolves, traditional definitions of what constitutes a financial or non-financial entity are being challenged and eroded.[18] Telegram’s multifunctional infrastructure presents a significant classification challenge:[19] It is neither a purely instant-messaging service nor purely a “digital wallet.” However, considering the scope of financial activities conducted through the platform, especially illicit financial activity, and the variety of payment and money transfer functionalities integrated into or accessible through its interface, classifying Telegram merely as an instant-messaging service creates a vulnerability that allows illicit activities to remain hidden.

Based on the typologies identified in the FATF’s June 2026 report, the FATF could consider three potential approaches to addressing the role of messaging apps such as Telegram in money laundering and terrorist financing risks:

1. Designating Telegram as Subject to AML/CFT Obligations

The first option would be to consider whether Telegram should be brought within the scope of AML/CFT obligations under the FATF Standards. This could extend beyond situations where Telegram provides or facilitates financial services to circumstances where, even when acting primarily as a communications or technology intermediary, its platform is used to facilitate or coordinate activities raising credible money laundering or terrorist-financing concerns.

As highlighted in the FATF’s June 2026 typologies, messaging apps may enable criminal and terrorist actors to communicate, recruit, solicit funds, conduct fundraising, exploit monetization features, and coordinate illicit activities before any financial transaction occurs. The vulnerability is therefore not limited to “pure” financial services embedded in or connected to Telegram but may also arise at the communication and coordination stage preceding a financial transaction.

Accordingly, the FATF could consider a proportionate, risk-based framework under which SMSPs could become subject to defined AML/CFT responsibilities, potentially including reporting-entity obligations where their activities and risk exposure justify such treatment. The applicable obligations could be calibrated according to platform functionality, degree of control or involvement, and the nature of the financial-crime or terrorist-financing risks.

It is reasonable to ask whether imposing reporting duties on a messaging platform raises privacy and freedom of expression concerns. Without resolving that question, it is worth noting the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) as an example of a regulatory framework that already imposes specific content-related obligations on certain online services. Depending on the type of service, these obligations include providing notice-and-action mechanisms, reporting on content moderation, and taking measures to protect minors. The DSA also requires designated very large online platforms and very large online search engines to assess and mitigate systemic risks arising from the design, functioning, or use of their services.[20] Telegram itself has faced scrutiny under the DSA over its reported EU user numbers, alongside separate criminal proceedings in France involving its founder and CEO, Pavel Durov.[21]

2. Maintaining the Existing Framework, with Enhanced Risk Differentiation and Due Diligence

The second option would be to retain the existing distinction between traditional obligated entities such as banks and other regulated financial institutions and SMSPs such as Telegram, without formally designating SMSPs as AML/CFT-obligated entities.

However, we do not consider a strict binary approach to be fully adequate, given the hybrid and evolving nature of platforms such as Telegram. If the FATF wishes to preserve a clear legal distinction between traditional financial institutions and technology or communications platforms, it could consider introducing a new intermediate category or otherwise explicitly recognizing the heightened risks associated with such platforms.

Under this approach, banks, VASPs, wallet providers, and other regulated financial institutions would remain primarily responsible for conducting enhanced customer due diligence and transaction monitoring when dealing with financial activities involving Telegram or similar platforms. Telegram would remain an intermediary rather than a traditional obligated entity but could be expected to respond to lawful and proportionate information requests from regulated financial institutions and competent authorities where relevant to the continuation or assessment of financial activity conducted through or in connection with its platform.

3. Adopting a Multi-Category, Function-Based Approach

The third option would adopt a multi-category or functional approach, identifying the specific contexts in which Telegram and similar SMSPs move beyond their role as instant messaging or communications platforms and become facilitators of financial activity or financial crime.

Under this model, Telegram’s regulatory status and obligations would depend on the specific functionality and activity involved. While ordinary communications would remain outside traditional AML/CFT obligations, proportionate responsibilities could apply where Telegram facilitates fundraising, monetization, peer-to-peer transfers, virtual assets, embedded payment services, or other financial activities.

This approach broadly aligns with the FATF’s June 2026 report and its functional, risk-based assessment of SMSPs. It offers regulatory flexibility while avoiding the imposition of full AML/CFT obligations solely because a platform is used for communications. The key challenge, however, would be establishing clear thresholds and ensuring effective enforcement when a platform moves from a communications intermediary to a material facilitator of financial activity or terrorist financing.

Of the three approaches, the third option, a multi-category, function-based framework, may provide the most proportionate and flexible long-term solution, while incorporating elements of the first two approaches. The FATF could establish clear thresholds for when an SMSP remains a neutral communications intermediary, when it assumes enhanced cooperation and information-sharing responsibilities, and when its specific activities bring it within the scope of AML/CFT obligations.

Regardless of the regulatory model selected, the FATF should consider three complementary measures:

  1. Adopt proportionate, risk-based AML/CFT responsibilities based on platform functionality, particularly where SMSPs facilitate fundraising, monetization, virtual assets, or payment services.
  2. Extend reporting and escalation mechanisms to the pre-transaction stage to enable the identification and escalation of credible terrorist-financing and financial-crime indicators before funds are transferred.
  3. Strengthen information-sharing and cooperation among SMSPs, competent authorities, financial institutions, and VASPs to support earlier intervention and address emerging typologies.

Overall, the FATF should clarify the respective responsibilities of SMSPs and financial-sector actors across the financial-crime and terrorist-financing lifecycle, recognizing that risks may arise at the communication and coordination stage well before a financial transaction occurs.

Telegram illustrates why AML/CFT oversight cannot end with the formal classification of the entity executing a transaction. Full obligations should remain with the entity providing or materially controlling the covered financial service, while proportionate platform-level duties may be warranted where Telegram’s own role creates distinct risks.

We believe this allocation would allow financial enforcement to serve as an additional tool in broader efforts to combat criminal activity on Telegram – much of which is financial in nature, ranging from the sale of nonconsensual intimate images to illicit arms dealing – and to strengthen existing regulatory frameworks aimed at promoting user safety in online spaces.

[1] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Detecting and Disrupting Terrorist Financing Activity through Social Media, Instant Messaging Applications and Streaming Platforms (SMSPs) (26 June 2026),TF and social media.

[2] Ibid, p.6.

[3] Ibid, p.4.

[4]See Crypto Wallet, https://walt.io/ton.

[5] See, e.g., Mirko Franco, Ombretta Gaggi, and Claudio E. Palazzi, Characterizing Non-Consensual Intimate Image Abuse on Telegram Groups and Channels, In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Open Challenges in Online Social Networks (OASIS ‘24), Poznań, Poland, September 2024 (Association for Computing Machinery, 2024) https://doi.org/10.1145/3677117.3685008. This may also create in the relevant cases an emerging regulatory gap at the intersection of autonomous AI agents, digital monetization and financial crime. Within Telegram’s ecosystem, such bots may automate payment collection, enforce paid access to digital communities and execute financial transactions, potentially creating opportunities for money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion. While FATF has examined AI-related AML/CFT vulnerabilities, terrorist-financing risks associated with social media and instant messaging platforms, and risks involving virtual assets and decentralized finance, the specific implications of autonomous AI-enabled payment and trading bots remain underexplored. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (July 2025), at p.59.

[6] Taro Tsuchiya et al., A Large-Scale Study of Telegram Bots, 20 Proc. Int’l AAAI Conf. on Web & Soc. Media 2280, 2280–93 (2026), https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v20i1.42750; Flavia S., Telegram NFT Transactions Soar by 400% in Q3, Driven by Gaming Surge, Cryptoflies (October 21, 2024), https://blog.cryptoflies.com/telegram-nft-transactions-soar-by-400-in-q3-driven-by-gaming-surge/.

[7]Michael Barbaro, How Telegram Became a Platform for Terrorism, The Daily podcast – New York times (Sept. 23, 2024); Urian B., Telegram Sees Over 100% Increase in Cybercriminal Activities | Data Dumps Spotted, Tech Times (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/265498/20210917/telegram-sees-over-100-increase-in-cybercriminal-activities-data-dumps-spotted.htm; Sheera Frenkel and Stuart A. Thompson, Telegram’s Role in Crime and Terrorism Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/07/technology/telegram-crime-terrorism.html; Mamoun Alazab and Kate Macfarlane, Why Telegram became the go-to app for Ukrainians – despite being rife with Russian disinformation, IMEdD (April 4, 2022); Polly Thompson, One year after his arrest, Pavel Durov says he’d ‘rather die’ than give third parties access to messages on Telegram, Business Insider (Aug 25, 2025), https://www.businessinsider.com/pavel-durov-telegram-ceo-user-data-privacy-arrest-2025-8.

[8]  Joeri Loggen et al., Online criminal markets on Telegram: Exploring the illicit products and services advertised in public group chats, 182 Computers in Human Behavior (2026).

[9] See footnote 23 below.

[10] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), p. 5.

[11] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (July 2025), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/comprehensive-update-terrorist-financing-risks-2025.html.

[12] Ibid, pp. 40-41. For more information see, Spain’s High Court Orders Block on Telegram Messaging  App as a Precautionary Measure, Euronews (Mar. 23, 2024), https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/03/23/spains-high-court-orders-block-on-telegram-messaging-app-as-a-precautionary-measure.

[13] Ibid, pp. 69-70.

[14] Ibid, p. 73.

[15] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), p. 5.

[16] Alongside instant messaging services, mobile money also gained increased significance for financiers and groups, especially in jurisdictions where registration of SIM cards is not controlled and particularly where mobile money operators are not subject to AML/CFT regulation or are unaware of the TF risks they face. These patterns are particularly observed in East and Central Africa, as well as in Yemen. See, e.g., GABAC, Mutual Evaluation Report of Republic of Chad (July 2023), p. 87; FATF, Guidance for a risk-based approach: Prepaid cards, mobile payments and internet-based payment services (June 2013), para. 112.

[17] This may also relate to the prevailing approach in platform-liability doctrine, which generally exempts social-media and communication platforms from responsibility for user-generated content. Under U.S. federal law for example, Section 230 shields “interactive computer services” – including search engines, social-media platforms, websites, and message boards – from tort or state criminal liability for third-party content, subject to statutory exceptions.

[18] Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks, FATF (July 2025), https://blog.cryptoflies.com/telegram-nft-transactions-soar-by-400-in-q3-driven-by-gaming-surge/.  

[19] Discord and Signal are also relevant platforms that may raise similar classification issues.

[20] See Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 19, 2022, arts. 15,16, 28, 34-35, 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1, 64–66 (Digital Services Act) (requiring very large online platforms to identify, analyze, assess, and mitigate systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning, or use of their services).

[21] In August 2024, Telegram founder and CEO Pavel Durov was arrested in France and subsequently placed under formal investigation for, inter alia, alleged complicity in administering an online platform used to facilitate illicit transactions, offenses relating to illegal content, and failures to cooperate with competent authorities. Separately, EU authorities examined Telegram for potential DSA-related violations, while several countries threatened to block or restrict the platform over concerns regarding illegal content, disinformation, and limited cooperation with law-enforcement authorities. See: Pascale Davies, Telegram ban: Which countries are clamping down on it and why?, EuroNews (August 27, 2024), https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/08/27/telegram-which-countries-have-banned-it-or-are-clamping-down-on-it-and-why; Ingrid Melander and Guy Faulconbridge, Telegram messaging app CEO Durov arrested in France, Reuters (August 24, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/telegram-messaging-app-ceo-pavel-durov-arrested-france-tf1-tv-says-2024-08-24/; EU Investigating if Telegram Played Down User Numbers to Avoid Regulation, Ars Technica (Aug. 2024), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/08/eu-investigating-if-telegram-played-down-user-numbers-to-avoid-regulation/.

Sevinj Novruzova is an Affiliated Fellow and Nofar Shemla Kadosh is a Graduate Student Fellow at the New York University Information Law Institute. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed within all posts are those of the author(s) alone and do not represent those of the Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) or of the New York University School of Law. PCCE makes no representations as to the accuracy, completeness and validity or any statements made on this site and will not be liable any errors, omissions or representations. The copyright of this content belongs to the author(s) and any liability with regards to infringement of intellectual property rights remains with the author(s).

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