Photograph courtesy of the writer
Lately, I’ve been requested whether or not using company monitorships could also be fading into the background. With indicators of declining enforcement depth and elevated leniency towards company companies inside america—significantly on the federal stage[1]—some observers have begun to wonder if screens are nonetheless a practical function of post-resolution oversight. The quick reply is sure. The longer reply, and the extra necessary one for multinational companies, is that focusing completely on the U.S. Division of Justice (“DOJ”) dramatically understates each the prevalence and the attain of monitorships at present.[2]
Even in intervals when DOJ coverage and rhetoric suggests a interval of decreased enforcement is underway, screens have by no means been a DOJ-only software. In america alone, screens are routinely utilized by a variety of federal and state actors, together with the Securities and Change Fee, the Federal Commerce Fee, state attorneys basic, and sector-specific regulators.[3] Outdoors america, monitorships—and intently associated oversight mechanisms—have develop into a regular function of enforcement and settlement observe worldwide. Worldwide establishments, together with the World Financial institution Group, depend on unbiased screens to supervise remediation and compliance following sanctions determinations, and related oversight constructions seem in commerce and improvement contexts that intersect with the work of the World Financial institution Group.[4] These mechanisms mirror a shared understanding amongst international establishments that unbiased, post-resolution oversight is usually needed to make sure that formal commitments translate into significant institutional change.
Brazil provides one other good instance of how monitorships have subtle past U.S. enforcement. Within the wake of the Lava Jato investigations, Brazilian authorities—together with the Ministério Público Federal and the Workplace of the Comptroller Basic (CGU)—have included unbiased screens into leniency agreements to supervise compliance reforms, governance modifications, and inside controls.[5] These preparations should not spinoff or symbolic. They’re central enforcement instruments, usually modeled partially on U.S. observe however tailored to Brazilian administrative and authorized constructions.
This actuality is finest understood in opposition to the backdrop of the previous fifteen years of accelerating multijurisdictional enforcement.[6] As enforcement authority has globalized, so too have post-resolution instruments. Mechanisms as soon as related primarily with U.S. observe—together with deferred prosecution agreements, mandated compliance reforms, and unbiased screens—are actually utilized by regulators and prosecutors throughout jurisdictions.[7] For multinational companies, which means that avoiding a DOJ-imposed monitor doesn’t remove monitorship threat. An organization should discover itself topic to an unbiased monitor appointed by a overseas authority, a global establishment, or as a part of a coordinated decision involving a number of regulators—even the place U.S. prosecutors decline to insist on one.
In my current chapter, Unbiased Monitorships, for the Cambridge Handbook on Organizational Tradition and Misconduct, I hint how trendy monitorships have advanced from court-appointed particular masters into versatile enforcement instruments designed to supervise remediation, governance reform, and, more and more, organizational tradition.[8] That chapter exhibits that monitorships persist exactly as a result of they serve a operate that financial penalties alone can not: they embed unbiased oversight inside organizations which have demonstrated an lack of ability—or unwillingness—to remediate misconduct on their very own. This logic applies with equal drive in home, overseas, and worldwide enforcement contexts.
Equally, my forthcoming Edward Elgar encyclopedia entry, Unbiased Compliance Displays, situates monitorships inside a broader ecosystem of oversight mechanisms, emphasizing that they don’t seem to be tied to any single regulator or political second.[9] Displays are used when authorities—whether or not the DOJ, Brazilian enforcement our bodies, or worldwide establishments related to international commerce and improvement—understand a niche between formal compliance commitments and precise institutional capability. Enforcement priorities could shift, however that hole stays a persistent governance drawback.
The takeaway is simple however often missed: firms can not assume that monitorships are “off the desk” just because DOJ seems much less inclined to impose them at a given second. In a world of overlapping enforcement authority and shared post-resolution instruments—one that features U.S. regulators, Brazilian authorities, and worldwide establishments comparable to these working within the WTO ecosystem—screens stay very a lot in play. Boards, in-house counsel, and compliance leaders can be well-served to know how monitorships function throughout jurisdictions earlier than concluding that this type of oversight is a relic of a extra aggressive enforcement period.
[1] See e.g., Wolters Kluwer, Federal Regulatory Enforcement Plummets 37% as States Rush to Fill Compliance Void, Wolters Kluwer Evaluation Reveals (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/information/federal-regulatory-enforcement-plummets-37-as-states-rush-to-fill-compliance-void.
[2] See typically Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, forthcoming in Concise Encyclopedia of Compliance Regulation (Edward Elgar 2026) (explaining the persistence of monitorships throughout enforcement cycles and regulatory contexts).
[3] See Veronica Root Martinez, Public Reporting of Monitorship Outcomes, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 760–64 (2023) (documenting using screens by the DOJ, SEC, FTC, Division of Well being and Human Companies, and different federal and state authorities).
[4] See World Financial institution Grp., Integrity Compliance on the World Financial institution Group: Steadily Requested Questions (Apr. 2020) (describing the position of the Integrity Compliance Officer and using unbiased integrity compliance screens as situations for launch from World Financial institution Group sanctions), https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/da26092a692560030e0f2dd5c0a8c07b-0090012020/unique/ICO-FAQs-4-2020.pdf; see additionally Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, supra be aware 2 (discussing the diffusion of monitorship-style oversight into worldwide and transnational regulatory regimes, together with trade- and development-related establishments that function alongside the WTO framework).
[5] See FGV Direito SP Examine Group on Monitorships, Use of Submit-Settlement Displays within the Context of Leniency Agreements (Might 2025) (unofficial English translation) (documenting using post-settlement monitorships in Brazil, together with unbiased exterior screens, authority-led monitoring, and hybrid fashions, in leniency agreements involving the Ministério Público Federal, the CGU, and CADE) (on file with writer); see additionally Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, supra be aware 2 (discussing Brazilian monitorships as a part of the worldwide unfold of post-resolution oversight instruments).
[6] Rachel Brewster, The Rise of World FCPA Settlements, 104 Tex. L. Rev. 299, 301–06 (2025), see additionally OECD, Governments’ Assessments of Company Anti-Corruption Compliance 7–9 (2025), Governments’ assessments of company anti-corruption compliance | OECD.
[7] See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Company Prosecutions, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1775, 1782–89 (2011) (describing the rise of multijurisdictional enforcement and shared settlement mechanisms); Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Monitorships, forthcoming in Cambridge Handbook on Organizational Tradition and Misconduct (2026).
[8] Martinez, Unbiased Monitorships, supra be aware 6. (tracing the evolution of monitorships from court-appointed particular masters to trendy compliance and culture-focused oversight mechanisms).
[9] Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, supra be aware 1 (situating monitorships inside a broader ecosystem of home, overseas, and worldwide enforcement instruments and emphasizing their sturdiness throughout political and regulatory shifts).
Veronica Root Martinez is the Simpson Thacher & Bartlett Distinguished Professor of Regulation at Duke College College of Regulation and Lead Guide to the OECD on its Strengthening Compliance Assessments Initiative.
The views, opinions and positions expressed inside all posts are these of the writer(s) alone and don’t characterize these of the Program on Company Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) or of the New York College College of Regulation. PCCE makes no representations as to the accuracy, completeness and validity or any statements made on this website and won’t be liable any errors, omissions or representations. The copyright or this content material belongs to the writer(s) and any legal responsibility almost about infringement of mental property rights stays with the writer(s).
Photograph courtesy of the writer
Lately, I’ve been requested whether or not using company monitorships could also be fading into the background. With indicators of declining enforcement depth and elevated leniency towards company companies inside america—significantly on the federal stage[1]—some observers have begun to wonder if screens are nonetheless a practical function of post-resolution oversight. The quick reply is sure. The longer reply, and the extra necessary one for multinational companies, is that focusing completely on the U.S. Division of Justice (“DOJ”) dramatically understates each the prevalence and the attain of monitorships at present.[2]
Even in intervals when DOJ coverage and rhetoric suggests a interval of decreased enforcement is underway, screens have by no means been a DOJ-only software. In america alone, screens are routinely utilized by a variety of federal and state actors, together with the Securities and Change Fee, the Federal Commerce Fee, state attorneys basic, and sector-specific regulators.[3] Outdoors america, monitorships—and intently associated oversight mechanisms—have develop into a regular function of enforcement and settlement observe worldwide. Worldwide establishments, together with the World Financial institution Group, depend on unbiased screens to supervise remediation and compliance following sanctions determinations, and related oversight constructions seem in commerce and improvement contexts that intersect with the work of the World Financial institution Group.[4] These mechanisms mirror a shared understanding amongst international establishments that unbiased, post-resolution oversight is usually needed to make sure that formal commitments translate into significant institutional change.
Brazil provides one other good instance of how monitorships have subtle past U.S. enforcement. Within the wake of the Lava Jato investigations, Brazilian authorities—together with the Ministério Público Federal and the Workplace of the Comptroller Basic (CGU)—have included unbiased screens into leniency agreements to supervise compliance reforms, governance modifications, and inside controls.[5] These preparations should not spinoff or symbolic. They’re central enforcement instruments, usually modeled partially on U.S. observe however tailored to Brazilian administrative and authorized constructions.
This actuality is finest understood in opposition to the backdrop of the previous fifteen years of accelerating multijurisdictional enforcement.[6] As enforcement authority has globalized, so too have post-resolution instruments. Mechanisms as soon as related primarily with U.S. observe—together with deferred prosecution agreements, mandated compliance reforms, and unbiased screens—are actually utilized by regulators and prosecutors throughout jurisdictions.[7] For multinational companies, which means that avoiding a DOJ-imposed monitor doesn’t remove monitorship threat. An organization should discover itself topic to an unbiased monitor appointed by a overseas authority, a global establishment, or as a part of a coordinated decision involving a number of regulators—even the place U.S. prosecutors decline to insist on one.
In my current chapter, Unbiased Monitorships, for the Cambridge Handbook on Organizational Tradition and Misconduct, I hint how trendy monitorships have advanced from court-appointed particular masters into versatile enforcement instruments designed to supervise remediation, governance reform, and, more and more, organizational tradition.[8] That chapter exhibits that monitorships persist exactly as a result of they serve a operate that financial penalties alone can not: they embed unbiased oversight inside organizations which have demonstrated an lack of ability—or unwillingness—to remediate misconduct on their very own. This logic applies with equal drive in home, overseas, and worldwide enforcement contexts.
Equally, my forthcoming Edward Elgar encyclopedia entry, Unbiased Compliance Displays, situates monitorships inside a broader ecosystem of oversight mechanisms, emphasizing that they don’t seem to be tied to any single regulator or political second.[9] Displays are used when authorities—whether or not the DOJ, Brazilian enforcement our bodies, or worldwide establishments related to international commerce and improvement—understand a niche between formal compliance commitments and precise institutional capability. Enforcement priorities could shift, however that hole stays a persistent governance drawback.
The takeaway is simple however often missed: firms can not assume that monitorships are “off the desk” just because DOJ seems much less inclined to impose them at a given second. In a world of overlapping enforcement authority and shared post-resolution instruments—one that features U.S. regulators, Brazilian authorities, and worldwide establishments comparable to these working within the WTO ecosystem—screens stay very a lot in play. Boards, in-house counsel, and compliance leaders can be well-served to know how monitorships function throughout jurisdictions earlier than concluding that this type of oversight is a relic of a extra aggressive enforcement period.
[1] See e.g., Wolters Kluwer, Federal Regulatory Enforcement Plummets 37% as States Rush to Fill Compliance Void, Wolters Kluwer Evaluation Reveals (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/information/federal-regulatory-enforcement-plummets-37-as-states-rush-to-fill-compliance-void.
[2] See typically Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, forthcoming in Concise Encyclopedia of Compliance Regulation (Edward Elgar 2026) (explaining the persistence of monitorships throughout enforcement cycles and regulatory contexts).
[3] See Veronica Root Martinez, Public Reporting of Monitorship Outcomes, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 760–64 (2023) (documenting using screens by the DOJ, SEC, FTC, Division of Well being and Human Companies, and different federal and state authorities).
[4] See World Financial institution Grp., Integrity Compliance on the World Financial institution Group: Steadily Requested Questions (Apr. 2020) (describing the position of the Integrity Compliance Officer and using unbiased integrity compliance screens as situations for launch from World Financial institution Group sanctions), https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/da26092a692560030e0f2dd5c0a8c07b-0090012020/unique/ICO-FAQs-4-2020.pdf; see additionally Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, supra be aware 2 (discussing the diffusion of monitorship-style oversight into worldwide and transnational regulatory regimes, together with trade- and development-related establishments that function alongside the WTO framework).
[5] See FGV Direito SP Examine Group on Monitorships, Use of Submit-Settlement Displays within the Context of Leniency Agreements (Might 2025) (unofficial English translation) (documenting using post-settlement monitorships in Brazil, together with unbiased exterior screens, authority-led monitoring, and hybrid fashions, in leniency agreements involving the Ministério Público Federal, the CGU, and CADE) (on file with writer); see additionally Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, supra be aware 2 (discussing Brazilian monitorships as a part of the worldwide unfold of post-resolution oversight instruments).
[6] Rachel Brewster, The Rise of World FCPA Settlements, 104 Tex. L. Rev. 299, 301–06 (2025), see additionally OECD, Governments’ Assessments of Company Anti-Corruption Compliance 7–9 (2025), Governments’ assessments of company anti-corruption compliance | OECD.
[7] See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Company Prosecutions, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1775, 1782–89 (2011) (describing the rise of multijurisdictional enforcement and shared settlement mechanisms); Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Monitorships, forthcoming in Cambridge Handbook on Organizational Tradition and Misconduct (2026).
[8] Martinez, Unbiased Monitorships, supra be aware 6. (tracing the evolution of monitorships from court-appointed particular masters to trendy compliance and culture-focused oversight mechanisms).
[9] Veronica Root Martinez, Unbiased Compliance Displays, supra be aware 1 (situating monitorships inside a broader ecosystem of home, overseas, and worldwide enforcement instruments and emphasizing their sturdiness throughout political and regulatory shifts).
Veronica Root Martinez is the Simpson Thacher & Bartlett Distinguished Professor of Regulation at Duke College College of Regulation and Lead Guide to the OECD on its Strengthening Compliance Assessments Initiative.
The views, opinions and positions expressed inside all posts are these of the writer(s) alone and don’t characterize these of the Program on Company Compliance and Enforcement (PCCE) or of the New York College College of Regulation. PCCE makes no representations as to the accuracy, completeness and validity or any statements made on this website and won’t be liable any errors, omissions or representations. The copyright or this content material belongs to the writer(s) and any legal responsibility almost about infringement of mental property rights stays with the writer(s).
